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Rights discourse can be simultaneously liberating and limiting.1 Rights are limiting 
when they are essentialized, universalized, and placed above the fray of human 
affairs.2 They can be dangerous when they are abstracted from the real-world 
struggles faced by ordinary people.3 On the other hand, rights can be liberating if 
they are used as political tools.4 They create opportunities to either challenge or 
facilitate governmental action.5 When rights are regarded as real-world—rather than 
metaphysical—instruments, they can be strategically deployed or discarded, given 
the grounded context in which they operate.6 Rights are not heavenly endowments or 
intellectually pure forms.7 They are very human constructs and, as such, are not 
beyond human manipulation.8 As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed: “The life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”9   
The experience of Indigenous peoples within Canada’s constitution 
highlights the composite nature of rights. Rights have been both liberating and 
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limiting.10 Aboriginal and treaty rights within Canada’s constitution do not flow from 
an ultimate convergence in values.11 Widespread agreement about their nature and 
purpose is far from self-evident.12 Reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and 
the Crown is an abstract aspiration.13 In particular, efforts to overturn federal 
legislative discrimination have largely failed; rights discourse has not yielded 
significant victories for Indigenous peoples in Canada in this regard.14 Despite strong 
academic commentary that section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198215 recognizes 
and affirms a right to Aboriginal self-government,16 the Supreme Court of Canada 
has not recognized this power.17 The federal Indian Act18 stands in the way of good 
Indigenous governance while remaining resilient in the face of rights challenges.19  
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Since 1876, the federal Indian Act has inappropriately detracted from First 
Nations’ power. The Act flows from the idea that Indigenous people are inferior and 
must be schooled in Canadian forms to hasten assimilation.20 The Act is explicitly 
designed to rupture First Nations socio-political relations and forcibly absorb 
individual Nation members within broader Canadian society.21 Its formal operation 
has devastating effects. Its underlying philosophy damages most everyone it touches. 
Its provisions narrowly define and heavily regulate Indigenous peoples’ citizenship,22 
land rights,23 succession rules,24 political organization,25 economic opportunities,26 
fiscal management,27 educational patterns, and attainment.28 The Act makes First 
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Nations largely subject to provincial legislation and regulation without their 
consent.29 It usurps First Nations’ authority and responsibility to deal with their own 
problems in an effective way.  
This article examines the ineffectual nature of rights discourse as it relates 
to overturning the Indian Act. It argues that rights could be more successfully 
employed if Indigenous peoples’ own views about them were given greater 
prominence. In so doing, this article advances the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself 
on the meaning of the rights at stake.”30 Seeing rights as perspectival brings them 
into the real world. It helps us see that rights are subjective. They are human-
centered creations; they do not embody objective truths. Viewing rights in this way 
liberates Indigenous peoples from fully embracing or rejecting them. Rights should 
be seen for what they are—helpful for some purposes, harmful for others. A selective 
invocation of rights discourse does not require the adoption of a worldview that puts 
rights at the centre of life. While particular worldviews may have generated rights 
discourse, thus making their use an extremely risky affair,31 the future effects of 
these worldviews are not preordained.32 Contemporary legal politics is rife with 
ambiguities, contingencies and uncertainties. Rights are neither necessarily 
individuated, liberal constructs,33 nor inevitably receptive to Indigenous collective 
concerns. 34  Rights are susceptible to human manipulation and progressive 
application, though we must always respect and see truths in claims to the contrary.35  
This article unfolds in four parts. Part I further discusses the contingent 
nature of rights. Part II addresses federalism in relation to the Indian Act. It suggests 
that section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 should be interpreted to prevent 
unilateral action by Parliament when Indigenous governance is at issue. Part III 
argues that rights discourse should be used to repudiate the presumed extinguishment 
of Aboriginal rights by implication in Canada’s historic and contemporary 
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(A Critical Edition) (New York: New York University Press, 2004). 
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35 Audre Lord, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” in Reina Lewis & Sara 
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jurisprudence. The assumption in the Sparrow case, that the Crown could unilaterally 
extinguish rights prior to 1982, is offensive. It does not advance a politically 
persuasive point of view, particularly when considering Indigenous perspectives on 
the meaning of the rights at stake. In advancing this theme Part IV argues that the 
Indian Act has not extinguished Indigenous governance rights under doctrines of 
sovereign incompatibility, actual consideration of the conflict, or explicit legislative 
enactment. Furthermore, the fact that the federal government has regulated 
Indigenous governance in great detail does not amount to the extinguishment of 
Indigenous governance. The federal government has explicitly recognized First 
Nations’ customary powers to exercise authority in relation to governance, land, and 
broader organizational questions.36 These points all lead to the conclusion that 
Indigenous governance is a pre-existing and unextinguished right under section 
35(1). First Nations governance should be recognized as existing, not as a result of 
the universal or abstract nature of Aboriginal rights, but because these rights have 
not been—and should not be—politically eclipsed by contrary federal action. 
I. THE CONTINGENCY OF RIGHTS 
When using rights as political tools First Nations people could argue that the Indian 
Act contravenes Aboriginal and treaty rights protected in section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. In fact, any statute that infringes upon Aboriginal and treaty 
rights could be subject to challenge under section 35(1). As noted earlier, such 
arguments would not claim ultimate truths about the world. Throughout history, and 
even at present, societies have organized themselves in different ways. Societies 
have appealed to other values in seeking to improve their relationships. Rights are a 
relatively recent invention and, while they are a vast improvement over many ways 
of dealing with conflict, they are not timeless or universal.37 As John Gray observed: 
“Human rights are not immutable truths, [nor are they] free-standing moral absolutes 
whose contents are self-evident. They are conventions, whose contents vary as 
circumstances and human interests vary.”38 Applying John Gray’s observation to 
Canada’s particular circumstances, Indigenous rights could function as 
conventions—“as convenient articles of peace, whereby individuals and 
communities with conflicting values and interests may [find ways] to co-exist.”39  
                                                
36 My first published article made this point in some detail in the context of the legal history of my 
community, the Chippewas of the Nawash: see John Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law: Inherent 
Sovereignty and First Nations Self Government” (1992) 30:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 291 [Borrows, 
“Genealogy of Law”]. 
37 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003) at 1: “I do not, however, argue that human rights are timeless, unchanging or absolute; any 
list or conception of human rights—and the idea of human rights itself—is historically specific and 
contingent.” 
38 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York: The New Press, 2000) at 106 [Gray, Two Faces]. 
39 Ibid at 105. 
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In making this argument it must be stressed that it is not only Aboriginal 
rights that are contingent and conditional on their surrounding contexts.40 My central 
argument is that rights in general are not fundamental to a free and democratic 
society.41 They are very, very, very important in our current mode of organization. 
They are “strong ethical pronouncements as to what should be,”42 and their robust 
use in contemporary jurisprudence is understandable.43 However, it is also important 
to simultaneously acknowledge that rights are not essential to human dignity and 
prosperity.44 Rights have a downside. They can even be undesirable in certain 
instances if they diminish democratic debate and engagement.45 Yet it is true that it is 
difficult to imagine human flourishing without rights, at least in our present 
circumstances, and I would hate to see rights go under our current framework. In 
fact, I want to preserve and strengthen their development and application, as long as 
their limitations are recognized.46 If we claim that rights are fundamental, we 
overreach. Such claims can create false horizons which limit our imagination and 
action in the real world.47 Rights discourse may prevent us from seeing other viable 
alternatives in challenging domination.48 In this respect I am anti-fundamentalist 
when it comes to rights and other essentialized legal constructs.49  
                                                
40 I recognize that such claims can be somewhat unconventional in present-day legal circles. Rights 
discourse has dominated legal theory for many years. Ronald Dworkin wrote about rights being 
‘trumps’ in argument: see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1977).  
41  Jeremy Bentham called natural rights “nonsense on stilts” when arguing for a non-foundational 
understanding of rights: see J Bowring, ed, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 2 (Edinburgh: William 
Tait, 1843) at 501. 
42 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2009) at 357 [Sen, The Idea of Justice]. 
43 Ethna Regan, Theology and the Boundary Discourse of Human Rights (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2010). 
44 Sen, The Idea of Justice, supra note 42 at 355–387. 
45 There are critics of desirability of rights discourse in Canada who fall on the so-called right and left of 
the political spectrum: see Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997); Alan Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and 
the Court Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights 
and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto, Wall & Thompson, 1989); Christopher Manfredi, 
Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2nd ed (Don 
Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
46 I make a similar argument in John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2016) [Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism]. For a 
discussion of how Indigenous peoples can pursue rights while recognizing their historic and contingent 
elements, see Paul Patton, “Foucault, Critique and Rights” (2005) 6:1 Critical Horizons 267.  
47 For strong arguments that challenge false horizons in working with Indigenous issues, see James Tully, 
Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume I: Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Tully, Democracy and Civic Freedom]. 
48 For example, if we say rights are fundamental we might spend all our time fighting about rights and 
consequently not make substantial changes in the real world, as I would argue is largely what has 
occurred under Canada’s section 35(1) jurisprudence: see Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds, Box of 
Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Pentiction, BC: Theytus Books, 2003); John 
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In fact, I worry when rights attract an almost religious aura in legal circles. 
A faith in their disembodied reality seems analogous to a hollow form of faith in 
God.50 Rights discourse often replicates forms of dogmatic doctrinal adherence that 
echo religious sectarianism.51 Rights followers can even be divided into different 
dominations, such as those who see political rights as separate from economic and 
social rights. Of course, some rights followers are more ecumenical and do not see 
dichotomies in political, economic and social rights.52 Nevertheless, the supremely 
elevated status of rights troubles me, if not put into context. For religionists, it would 
seem to border on idol worship to replace God with a human construct—like rights. 
If one does not believe in God, it may nevertheless be troubling to see how rights can 
attract the kind of reverence and deference that religionists often reserve for God.53 
As a thought experiment, I can almost imagine the first four commandments of rights 
discourse:  
1  And RIGHTS spake all these words, saying, 
2  I am RIGHTS thy a priori Form, which have brought thee out of the 
pre-societal state of nature, out of the house of bondage. 
3  Thou shalt have no other a priori Forms before me.  
4  Thou shalt not make unto thee any other pre-eminent a priori Form, or 
any likeness of any other a priori Form that is in heaven above, or that is 
in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. 
5  Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I, 
RIGHTS, am a jealous a priori Form, visiting the iniquity of the fathers 
upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate 
me;  
6  And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my 
principles.  
7  Thou shalt not take RIGHTS thy a priori Form in vain; for RIGHTS 
will not hold him guiltless that taketh His name in vain.54 
When I asked my colleague Ben Berger for his feedback on the analogy of 
rights to religion, he wrote: 
I like the move from your “non-fundamentalist” approach to the religion 
analogy. … It struck me that your claim had more to do with rights 
                                                                                                               
Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution” in Michael Coyle & John Borrows, eds, The Right(s) 
Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming]. 
49  For arguments against fundamentalism in Canada’s legal structure, see generally John Borrows, 
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Borrows, Freedom 
and Indigenous Constitutionalism, supra note 46. 
50 Steven D Smith, “Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation” (1993) 79:3 Va L Rev 583. 
51 David Kinley, “Human Rights Fundamentalisms” (2007) 29:4 Sydney L Rev 545. 
52 For a discussion of the sometimes dichotomous treatment of rights in the Canadian context, see Martha 
Jackman, “What’s Wrong with Social and Economic Rights?” (2000) 11:2 NJCL 235. 
53 For a discussion of idolatry and rights, see Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed 
by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
54 This is paraphrased from Exodus 20:1–7 (King James Version). 
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discourse taking on the worst of religion … what religion can look like 
when it takes a wrong turn. And that wrong turn is when it takes on 
idolatrous forms. Idolatry seems to me when one replaces substance with 
form or makes sacred that which is not the sacred essence at all, thereby 
stalling your spiritual movement … idol/idle. Thought about in this way, I 
wonder if what's going on is that rights discourse can begin to take on 
features of excess faith in the abstract, just like religion … when it stops 
tracking the real. So is it problematic inasmuch as rights can begin to 
sacrifice the complexly real with faith in the abstract? Reality, politics, 
human life, tragedy, etc., all takes a back seat to commitment to the 
RIGHTS. If so... 
Our Rights, which art in Charters 
Hallowed be thy claims. 
Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, 
On earth as it is in theory.55 
I agree with Professor Berger’s observation.56 At the same time, we both believe that 
the analogy of rights to religion should not be stretched too far.57 Nevertheless, a 
comparison is made here to prompt a more critical engagement with rights discourse. 
We should question the sources and scope of rights and the role of faith in their 
development and application. Failure to do so can cause us to overlook the 
contingent, context-dependent nature of rights.  
For example, we must continually remind ourselves that rights are subject to 
interpretation, which itself is dependent on “differing views of human interests”; as 
such, their application is not a value-free exercise.58 Morality plays a significant role 
in the interpretation of rights.59 As a result, rights can be filled with cross-cutting and 
inconsistent meanings.60 Even when considering a particular right, such as liberty or 
freedom, contradictory objectives can be called forth in its name.61 The meaning of 
liberty is enmeshed in conflict drawn from differing, even competing, values.62 There 
                                                
55 Email to the author. 
56 Further developments of Professor Berger’s ideas are found in Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: 
Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).  
57 For a discussion of the analogies and disanalogies between rights and religion, see Nazila Ghanea, Alan 
Stephens & Raphael Walden, eds, Does God Believe in Human Rights? Essays on Religion and Human 
Rights (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007). 
58 Gray, Two Faces, supra note 38 at 70. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Conflicting interpretations of rights are present in many Supreme Court of Canada cases. For example, 
in Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429 (CanLII), the Court 
provided different interpretations of the meaning of life, liberty and security under section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 15. For 
commentary concerning these differences, and the material basis of rights discourse, see Margot Young 
et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007). 
61 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 1. 
62 Gray, Two Faces, supra note 38 at 72. 
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is no a priori space to find incontestable meanings in relation to rights; culture and 
context matter a great deal in rights discourse.63  
This means that any theory of rights must acknowledge and incorporate the 
reality of conflict about their nature and scope. Consensus about the content or 
desirability of rights has not been found. We will always be mired in conflict about 
their meaning. This is a current fact of legal life, but it should not cause us to despair 
or to abandon them. Despite their less than ideal status and the ever-present 
possibility of conflict, rights can have value, particularly for Indigenous peoples. 
Rights occupy a political space where provisional peace could be advanced through 
argumentation, conflict and persuasion. The thesis of this article is that, despite many 
failures, First Nations peoples should (with extreme caution) continue to use rights 
discourse within section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to challenge the Indian 
Act’s failure to facilitate freedom and democracy. Rights discourse could be used to 
challenge the role of Parliament when Aboriginal and treaty rights are at issue. 
II. FEDERALISM, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE  
In line with this view, and to apply rights discourse to a particular issue, I argue that 
Parliament should not be able to act unilaterally in relation to Indigenous peoples 
merely because federal powers found in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
extend to “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.”64 Federal power should not 
make ‘Indians’ subordinate within Canada’s political and legal orders. Federal 
officers should not have the last or only word in this field. The invocation of 
Aboriginal rights can assist in this goal because constitutional rights are supposed to 
limit government action. With section 35(1) as a guide,65 section 91(24) is open to 
more democratic interpretations.66 It does not have to be read to justify domination.  
For example, the technical wording of section 91 as a whole is that federal 
powers are granted “in relation to” matters not assigned exclusively to provincial 
legislatures. In particular, the exclusive federal legislative authority in section 91(24) 
only “extends to” Indians and lands reserved for Indians. There should be a vast 
difference between legislative power extending to or in relation to a subject matter 
and legislative power over a particular group of people. The federal government’s 
power of “extending to” in section 91(24) should be read to bolster an “in relation 
                                                
63 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
64 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 
[Constitution Act, 1867]. 
65 In Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1109, the Supreme Court wrote: “Federal legislative powers continue, 
including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together with s. 35(1).” 
66 For further discussion, see Bradford Morse, “Government Obligations, Aboriginal Peoples and Section 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867” in David C Hawkes, ed, Aboriginal Peoples and Government 
Responsibility: Exploring Federal and Provincial Roles (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) 59. 
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to” approach to First Nations/Crown interactions. 67  A relational approach to 
Indigenous issues is more consistent with the goal of reconciliation that underlies 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.68 As Justice Binnie wrote in the Mikisew 
Cree case, “[t]he fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty 
rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their 
respective claims, interests and ambitions.”69 
Furthermore, in light of section 35(1) it should be recognized that 
Parliamentary power varies in relation to each matter in section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. 70  Some powers are broadly construed and others are 
narrowly interpreted. For example, the federal criminal law power in section 91(27) 
is currently quite broad,71 while the power of trade and commerce in section 91(2) is 
much narrower.72 This reflects the fact that many federal powers are constrained in 
accordance with their potential impact on provincial jurisdiction.73 Federal powers 
are also constrained by Aboriginal rights.74 This should lead to sharper distinctions 
between ‘Indians’ and other federal legislative matters found in section 91. In this 
respect, federal legislative power in relation to Indians and lands reserved for Indians 
should be narrowly construed when it negatively impacts on Indigenous rights. A 
                                                
67 For a discussion of rights as relational, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of 
Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
68 A recent discussion of reconciliation in the Canadian context is found in Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, What We Have Learned: Principles of Truth and Reconciliation (Ottawa: Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015), online: <www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/ 
2015/Findings/Principles%20of%20Truth%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf>. For a fuller discussion of the 
mutuality underlying reconciliation, see Jeffery G Hewitt, “Reconsidering Reconciliation: The Long 
Game” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 259 (QL); Mark D Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: 
Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, The Politics of Reconciliation in 
Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 165. 
69 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 1, [2005] 3 
SCR 388 (CanLII) [Mikisew Cree First Nation]. 
70 The Supreme Court has recognized the varying scope of different heads of powers. In Reference re 
Employment Insurance Act (Can), ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 at para 11, [2005] 2 SCR 669 (CanLII), 
the Court wrote: “Some heads that set forth narrow powers leave little room for interpretation. Other, 
broader, heads result in legislation that can have several aspects.” 
71 In RJR MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 28, 127 DLR (4th) 1 (CanLII), the 
Supreme Court of Canada wrote: “The criminal law power is plenary in nature and this Court has 
always defined its scope broadly.” The breadth of federal criminal law powers under section 91(27) has 
also been found in Reference re Firearms Act (Can), 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 SCR 783 (CanLII); R v 
Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, 68 OR (2d) 512 (CanLII). 
72 The federal trade and commerce power is interpreted narrowly, though given some scope, in General 
Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641, 68 OR (2d) 512 (CanLII). 
73 A leading case making this point is Ontario (AG) v Canada (AG) (the Local Prohibition Case), [1896] 
UKPC 20, [1896] AC 348 (BAILII). 
74 The Supreme Court has been clear that Crown constraints are a part of the framework of section 35(1). 
As the Court observed in the leading case of Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1106, citing Noel Lyon, “An 
Essay on Constitutional Interpretation” (1988) 26:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 95 at 100 [Lyon, “Constitutional 
Interpretation”]: “Section 35 calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules 
of the game under which the Crown established courts of law and denied those courts the authority to 
question sovereign claims made by the Crown.” 
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broad construction would be warranted when recognizing and affirming Aboriginal 
and treaty rights. ‘Indians’ are not like beacons, buoys, lighthouses, banks, weight, 
measures, the postal service, currency, promissory notes, patents, copyrights or most 
other federal matters listed in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.75 Unlike these 
other matters, Indians hold constitutionally protected rights and governmental 
powers; they have section 35(1) to bolster their sphere of influence. Therefore, 
section 91(24) should not be seen as authorizing unilateral decisions regarding 
Indians. 
Despite this alternative reading of section 91(24), courts often act as if 
Parliamentary intention alone should determine the legal status of Indians and lands 
reserved for Indians. A pre-Aboriginal rights example of this approach is found in 
Canada (AG) v Lavell; Isaac v Bedard, where Justice Ritchie held: “The legislation 
enacted to this end was, in my view, necessary for the implementation of the 
authority so vested in Parliament under the Constitution.”76 This argument should 
have limited persuasiveness because it was decided in 1974, before section 35 came 
into effect. The argument of legislative necessity does not excuse the government 
from abiding by the more recent provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982. So-called 
legislative necessity should give way to constitutional principles directed at the 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights. Rights discourse should cause the 
courts to measure legislative intentions against Aboriginal rights. As the Supreme 
Court of Canada wrote in Sparrow: 
Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to 
legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together 
with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with 
federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand 
the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or 
denies aboriginal rights.77 
When it comes to Indians, particularly under the Indian Act, the assumption that 
Parliamentary intention is an overriding value should be jettisoned.  
Thus, when interpreting the Indian Act, it should be difficult to sustain the 
idea that Parliament’s assimilative intention in regard to the Act is consistent with 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Indian Act was designed to heavily 
regulate Indigenous peoples’ forms of governance and to reconstitute those forms of 
                                                
75 Indians may be somewhat similar to aliens under section 91(25) in that Indians are people. That said, 
Indians are legally distinct from aliens because aliens come to Canada and require a legal process to be 
naturalized. Unlike aliens, Indians were ‘naturalized’ as peoples before Canada was formed, meaning 
they had political and legal rights to one another and their territories. 
76 Canada (AG) v Lavell; Isaac v Bedard, [1974] SCR 1349 at 1359, 38 DLR (3d) 481 (CanLII).  
77 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1109. The Supreme Court continued: “Such scrutiny is in keeping with the 
liberal interpretive principle enunciated in Nowegijick, [infra note 140], and the concept of holding the 
Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada as 
suggested by Guerin[, infra note 144].” 
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governance in subordination to others.78 While it has left certain inherent powers 
intact, the Indian Act has severely limited First Nations’ participation in the 
Canadian state and within their own communities.79 It has attempted to immobilize 
their political and legal development. While it is true that Parliament passed the 
Indian Act with a properly constituted majority, it would be the worst type of legal 
fiction to maintain that such action was democratic in the way the courts themselves 
have defined the term.80 The Indian Act does not measure-up to the Constitution’s 
democratic values. Recall that in R v Oakes the Supreme Court articulated some of 
the values inherent in the notion of democracy: 
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free 
and democratic society which I believe to embody, to name but a few, 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social 
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect 
for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.81 
The Indian Act falls far short of each named value. The Indian Act does not 
respect Indigenous peoples’ dignity. The Indian Act does not embody a commitment 
to social justice and equality as we currently understand these terms. The Indian Act 
does not respectfully accommodate Indigenous beliefs, nor does it respect group 
identity. The Indian Act undermines faith in social and political institutions and it 
does not enhance First Nations peoples’ participation in society. Therefore, the 
courts should not place much emphasis on Parliamentary intention when interpreting 
the Indian Act. It could lead to a rubber-stamping of actions that are distinctly 
undemocratic and destructive of freedom.  
Thus, it is important to recognize that, at least since 1982, the Crown’s 
sovereignty is constrained by numerous obligations to Aboriginal peoples when 
Aboriginal or treaty rights are at issue.82 Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
should be interpreted in a “large and liberal” way, which gives a generous meaning 
to the word ‘peoples’ in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.83 ‘Peoples’ has a 
political meaning under section 35,84 as a category that denotes political collectives 
                                                
78 See John Leslie & Ron Maguire, eds, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, 2nd ed (Ottawa: 
Treaties and Historical Research Centre, 1978). 
79 John Borrows, “Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and Violence Against Women” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 699 (QL). 
80 Indians did not have the vote or franchise during much of Canadian history. See Chief Joe Mathias and 
Gary R Yabsley, “Conspiracy of Legislation: The Suppression of Indian Rights in Canada” (1991) 89 
BC Studies 34. 
81 R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 136, 53 OR (2d) 719 (CanLII). 
82 Borrows, “Let Obligations Be Done”, supra note 5. 
83 R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 133, 137 DLR (4th) 648, L’Heureux-Dubé CJC dissenting 
(CanLII) [Gladstone]. 
84 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at paras 34–35 (CanLII); 
Canada (Indian Affairs) v Daniels, 2014 FCA 101 at paras 97–98, 371 DLR (4th) 725 (CanLII); 
Manitoba Métis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 14 at para 77, [2013] 1 SCR 623 (CanLII); R 
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who are ‘partners in confederation’.85 Section 91(24) should not be interpreted in an 
originalist context;86 it must be viewed in light of an ongoing nation-to-nation 
relationship between the federal Crown and Indigenous peoples.87 ‘Peoples’ has 
meaning in international law. Section 35(1) was drafted with this meaning as a 
backdrop to the domestic implementation of Canada’s international obligations.88 
Canada recognizes its international legal obligations as being relevant and persuasive 
as a source of law for the purpose of interpreting domestic statutes and as possibly 
assisting courts in the contextual approach to interpreting s 91(24).89 
As I have argued elsewhere,90 governmental obligations to First Nations 
peoples include: preventing the perpetuation of the “historical injustice suffered by 
aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers,” 91  not imposing unjustifiably 
                                                                                                               
v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1038, 70 DLR (4th) 427 (CanLII) [Sioui]; R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at 
para 11, [2003] 2 SCR 207 (CanLII). 
85  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-
Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993) [RCAP, Partners in 
Confederation]. 
86 John Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 351 (QL). 
87 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (AG), 51 OR (3d) 641, 195 DLR (4th) 135 at para 56 (CA) 
(CanLII). See also John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 125 where nation-to-nation commitments related to the Treaty of 
Niagara are outlined as follows: 
[T]hrough participation and consent, the Anishinabek and the Crown representatives created 
a pattern to follow in ‘constituting’ their relations. The principles include, among others the 
recognition of Aboriginal governance, free trade, open migration, respect for Aboriginal land 
holdings, affirmation of Aboriginal permission and consent in treaty matters, criminal justice 
protections, military assistance, respect for hunting and fishing rights and adherence to 
principles of peace and friendship. 
88 Catherine Bell, “Métis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)” (1997) 36:1 Alta L Rev 180 at 185 (QL): 
Rights arising from peoplehood are uncertain because the word ‘peoples’ is not defined in 
Canadian constitutional law and minimal domestic judicial opinion has been rendered on this 
point. However, it is a term which was used frequently in international political discourse at 
the time s. 35 was negotiated to distinguish colonized indigenous populations from nation 
states and ethnic minority immigrant populations within those states. 
89 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 69–71, 174 DLR 
(4th) 193 (CanLII). 
90 Borrows, “Let Obligations be Done”, supra note 5 at 206. 
91 R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 53, 138 DLR (4th) 385 (CanLII) [Côté]: 
… a static and retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble and 
prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent's proposed interpretation risks undermining 
the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal 
peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-
existing aboriginal societies. To quote the words of Brennan J. in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 
2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.), at p. 42: 
Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights 
and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and 
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted. 
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unreasonable limitations on rights,92 not imposing unjustifiably undue hardships on 
the exercise of rights,93 not unjustifiably denying Aboriginal peoples their preferred 
means of exercising rights,94 minimally impairing Aboriginal rights,95 allocating 
resources to Aboriginal peoples in cases where rights would be infringed, 96 
conserving resources for Aboriginal peoples where rights would be infringed,97 
protecting the safety of Aboriginal rights users,98 ensuring economic and regional 
fairness when infringing Aboriginal rights,99 appropriately structuring administrative 
discretion in relation to Aboriginal peoples,100 giving priority to Aboriginal peoples 
when rights are infringed (which varies with the nature of right),101 providing for 
Aboriginal participation in resource development when rights are infringed, 102 
reducing economic barriers for Aboriginal peoples when rights are infringed,103 and 
not violating Aboriginal individuals’ Charter rights. 104  Additional obligations 
include: recognition, affirmation, reconciliation, 105  non-extinguishment of rights 
without consent, 106  compensation, 107  consultation, 108  accommodation, 109 
                                                
92 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1112. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. See also generally Osoyoos Indian Band v Oliver (Town), 2001 SCC 85, [2001] 3 SCR 746 
(CanLII). 
96 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1117: “The appellants have, to employ the words of their counsel, a ‘right to 
share in the available resource’.” See also Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 
167, 153 DLR (4th) 193 (CanLII) [Delgamuukw], “that the conferral of fee simples for agriculture, and 
of leases and licenses for forestry and mining reflect the prior occupation of aboriginal title lands.” 
97 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1115–1117. 
98 For judicial statements that Aboriginal rights must be exercised in a way that does not endanger the 
safety of others, see, e.g., R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 at para 26, 170 DLR (4th) 385 (CanLII); R v 
Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at paras 88–92, 133 DLR (4th) 324 (CanLII) [Badger]. 
99 Delgamuukw, supra note 96 at para 161, quoting Gladstone, supra note 83 at para 75: “legitimate 
government objectives also include ‘the pursuit of economic and regional fairness’ and ‘the recognition 
of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-aboriginal groups.’” 
100 “In light of the Crown’s unique fiduciary obligations towards aboriginal peoples, Parliament may not 
simply adopt an unstructured discretionary administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal 
rights in a substantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit guidance.” R v Adams, 
[1996] 3 SCR 101 at para 54, 138 DLR (4th) 657 (CanLII) [Adams]. 
101 Gladstone, supra note 83 at paras 59–80. 
102 Delgamuukw, supra note 96 at para 167. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See, e.g., Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 173 DLR 
(4th) 1 (CanLII). 
105 See Mikisew Cree First Nation, supra note 69 at para 1: “The fundamental objective of the modern law 
of aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and 
their respective claims, interests and ambitions.” Reconciliation comes from Latin roots re, meaning 
‘again’; con, meaning ‘with’; and sella, meaning ‘seat’. Reconciliation, therefore, literally means ‘to sit 
again with’. 
106 R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 39, [2005] 2 SCR 220 (CanLII) [Marshall; Bernard]: 
“Prior to constitutionalization of aboriginal rights in 1982, aboriginal title could be extinguished by 
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administrative law procedural safeguards, 110  legislative dispute resolution 
mechanisms,111 and mitigation strategies.112 Due to the joint existence of Aboriginal 
rights and government obligations, Parliament should not be able to do as it pleases 
when it comes to Indigenous peoples. 
Thus, since the Indian Act touches many activities that may be protected as 
Aboriginal and treaty rights (land, governance, education, family organization, etc.), 
federal obligations should constrain the government’s scope for action when 
legislating in relation to matters currently covered by the Indian Act. The 
infringement of Aboriginal or treaty rights likely occurs when federal action is taken 
over issues related to Indian status, reserve rights, succession rules, political 
organization, economic development and education. These are all areas that should 
be considered unextinguished Aboriginal or treaty rights. Each field could be 
                                                                                                               
clear legislative act (see Van der Peet, [supra note 11] at para. 125). Now that is not possible.” See also 
Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial 
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33:2 Ottawa L Rev 301 (QL) [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in 
Canada”]. 
107 Delgamuukw, supra note 96 at para 169:  
The economic aspect of aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant to the question 
of justification as well, a possibility suggested in Sparrow[, supra note 30] and which I 
repeated in Gladstone[, supra note 83]. Indeed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty 
are a well-established part of the landscape of aboriginal rights: Guerin[, infra note 144]. In 
keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will 
ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infringed. The amount of compensation 
payable will vary with the nature of the particular aboriginal title affected and with the nature 
and severity of the infringement and the extent to which aboriginal interests were 
accommodated. 
 See also Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1119. 
108  “The government’s duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests is 
grounded in the honour of the Crown”: Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 
SCC 73 at para 16, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida]. 
109 Ibid at paras 49–50:  
The terms ‘accommodate’ and ‘accommodation’ have been defined as to ‘adapt, harmonize, 
reconcile’ … ‘an adjustment or adaptation to suit a special or different purpose … a 
convenient arrangement; a settlement or compromise’: Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English (9th ed. 1995), at p. 9. […] The Court’s decisions confirm this vision of 
accommodation. The Court in Sparrow raised the concept of accommodation, stressing the 
need to balance competing societal interests with Aboriginal and treaty rights. In R. v. Sioui, 
[supra note 84] at p. 1072, the Court stated that the Crown bears the burden of proving that 
its occupancy of lands ‘cannot be accommodated to reasonable exercise of the Hurons’ 
rights’. And in R. v. Côté, [supra note 91] at para. 81, the Court spoke of whether restrictions 
on Aboriginal rights ‘can be accommodated with the Crown’s special fiduciary relationship 
with First Nations’. Balance and compromise are inherent in the notion of reconciliation. 
110 Ibid at para 51; Adams, supra note 100 at para 54. 
111 Paul v British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 SCR 585 (CanLII); 
Haida, supra note 108 at para 44: “The government may wish to adopt dispute resolution procedures 
like mediation or administrative regimes with impartial decision-makers in complex or difficult cases.” 
112 See, e.g., Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 
74 at para 44, [2004] 3 SCR 550 (CanLII).  
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considered “integral to the distinctive culture” of Indians under the Van der Peet 
test,113 and thus protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This 
way, rights discourse could be of greater use to Indians, despite the contingent, non-
universal status of rights. Rights can lead to authoritative proclamations in our 
present context because governments have chosen to bind themselves to their non-
discriminatory interpretation and application.  
III. QUESTIONING EXTINGUISHMENT IN CANADIAN LAW 
Despite the potential infringement of Aboriginal or treaty rights by the Indian Act, 
some may argue Indians’ rights were extinguished by past government action before 
1982. This colonial and oppressive argument assumes that Indigenous rights, 
interests, responsibilities and possessions could be legitimately terminated by 
unilateral government action prior to the enactment of section 35(1). The notion that 
Indigenous peoples’ ways of life can disappear through government action replicates 
troubling stereotypes.114 It assumes there was something inferior, incompatible, less 
desirable or less worthy about Indigenous rights before they were given explicit 
protection. In the Aboriginal rights context, extinguishment is an offensive doctrinal 
concept that builds upon and entrenches discriminatory assumptions and stereotypes. 
It should be overturned. If properly deployed, rights could be an important step in 
discarding Canada’s colonial past. Rights discourse could challenge abstract 
concepts about what it means to be Indigenous in Canada; Indigenous peoples are 
often portrayed as past-tense peoples in Canada.115  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has not developed non-
discriminatory interpretations of extinguishment. In fact, the very first Aboriginal 
rights case decided under section 35(1) boldly reaffirmed extinguishment and 
ushered this doctrine into the heart of Canadian constitutional law under the 
Constitution Act, 1982.116 In Sparrow, the Court was asked to consider the meaning 
of ‘existing’ in the phrase ‘existing Aboriginal and treaty rights’, as written within 
section 35(1). In endorsing extinguishment, the Court wrote that: 
The word ‘existing’ makes it clear that the rights to which s. 35(1) applied 
are those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into 
effect. This means that extinguished rights are not revived by the 
                                                
113 Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 46. 
114 Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988); Berry Brewton, “The Myth of the Vanishing Indian” 
(1960) 21:1 Phylon 51. 
115 Unfortunately, in its initial formulation, the Supreme Court of Canada failed on precisely these 
grounds, as it defined Aboriginal rights in a past-tense fashion. See John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in 
Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997) 22:1 Am Indian L Rev 37. 
116 Extinguishment was a part of Canadian law prior to 1982. See McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal 
Title in Canada”, supra note 106 at 316–326. 
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Constitution Act, 1982. A number of courts have taken the position that 
the word ‘existing’ means being in actuality in 1982.117  
In my view, this is the most troubling paragraph ever penned by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. These three sentences may have done more to terminate Aboriginal rights 
than any other single action in Canadian history. The Court swallowed a host of 
troubling pre-1982 assumptions regarding extinguishment when it ruled that the 
word ‘existing’ did not ‘revive’ rights.118 In saying that rights cannot be revived, the 
Court assumed that they were already extinct due to prior government action.119  
The affirmation of the government’s power to unilaterally extinguish 
Aboriginal rights prior to 1982 is a wide-ranging ratification of past injustices.120 In 
this light it is difficult to regard Sparrow as a victory for Aboriginal peoples.121 
While Sparrow importantly constrained Crown sovereignty post-1982, the case is 
ultimately a huge loss for Aboriginal peoples in a broader context. With a few 
keystrokes, the Supreme Court of Canada potentially erased existing powers that 
were—and should still be—held by Aboriginal peoples despite the Crown’s attempts 
to expunge such activities. Indigenous peoples could spend the next 100 years 
arguing for Aboriginal rights under the seemingly more generous Sparrow 
framework, only to discover that most of their rights are off-limits to constitutional 
protection because of these three superficially innocuous sentences.  
It is not clear why the Court accepted the Crown’s point of view regarding 
extinguishment. The Court did not have to rule this way; it could have rejected 
extinguishment. It could have held that extinguishment has always been 
unconstitutional, regardless of the date the Crown claimed to exercise this power. 
After all, the body deciding Sparrow is the Supreme Court of Canada—it did not 
have to accept lower court opinions about extinguishment. In the same case the 
Court held that section 35(1) was “not just a codification of the case law on 
aboriginal rights that had accumulated by 1982.”122 The Court could thus have 
deviated from the case law and rejected historic acts of extinguishment.  
                                                
117 Sparrow, supra note 30. 
118 In Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 28, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the idea that “[a]t 
common law aboriginal rights did not, of course, have constitutional status, with the result that 
Parliament could, at any time, extinguish or regulate those rights”. 
119 Alternative arguments could have been developed which recharacterized extinguishment as restriction. 
For example, the United States Supreme Court was able to eventually develop arguments that inherent 
rights that were recognized and affirmed could revive Indigenous powers that were previously 
considered to be restricted. See United States v Lara, 541 US 193 (2004) at 199–200, 124 S Ct 1628.  
120 For a discussion of how courts in the United States have concluded Indigenous rights are extinguished, 
see Joseph William Singer, “Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land 
Claims” (1994) 28:2 Ga L Rev 481. 
121  For a positive assessment regarding the potential of the Sparrow case, see RCAP, Partners in 
Confederation, supra note 85 at 31. For a contrary opinion commenting on the limitations of the 
Sparrow decision, see WIC Binnie, “The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the 
Beginning?” (1990) 15:2 Queen’s LJ 217. 
122 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1106, quoting Lyon, “Constitutional Interpretation”, supra note 74 at 100. 
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The Court’s approach to the ‘idea’ of extinguishment also seems contrary to 
the trajectory of contemporary rights discourse. Extinguishment is not an acceptable 
part of international Indigenous human rights law.123 Nor does extinguishment have a 
place in general Canadian Charter jurisprudence. It is difficult to imagine that courts 
would sanction past extinguishment of rights to religion, association, life, liberty, 
security, equality and the like before the Charter came into being. One wonders why 
it was so easy for the Court to accept the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights without 
detailed explanation. Though rights are not universal and beyond question, 
Aboriginal rights are just as important to Indigenous peoples as Charter rights are to 
other people.  
IV. THE INDIAN ACT AND EXTINGUISHMENT 
As we have seen, if the extinguishment of Aboriginal or treaty rights is 
constitutionally permissible, then Indigenous peoples are forced onto unequal ground 
when arguing for their rights post-1982. Most Indigenous Nations would not be 
willing to concede the justice of extinguishment at any time during Canadian history. 
Endorsing this doctrine is not an acceptable political option. Nevertheless, rights 
discourse often pushes parties onto narrower grounds by forcing them into arguments 
‘in the alternative’. This demonstrates that rights are deficient. They are impure. 
They can be deeply unjust. We should check our propensity to place faith in their 
                                                
123 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st 
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/61/295 (2007), contains provisions that can be read as disapproving of 
extinguishment, including the following: 
Article 8 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation 
or destruction of their culture. 
States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: 
Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct 
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; 
Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or 
resources; 
Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; 
Any form of forced  
… 
Article 28 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which 
have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and 
informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take 
the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of 
monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
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unsullied application. Rights are not the product of pure reason; as such, rights are 
flawed, and we must deal with their flaws.  
Thus, arguments ‘in the alternative’ may be made to limit the effect of the 
law’s flawed reasoning concerning extinguishment. As a result, First Nations who 
challenge the Indian Act may feel compelled to make arguments that offend their 
sensibilities. For some, these ‘in the alternative’ arguments may unfortunately imply 
and seemingly concede that the government possessed a unilateral power of 
extinguishment prior to 1982. For example, arguing that rights were not properly 
extinguished in this instance may appear to suggest that rights could be properly 
extinguished in other circumstances. While I would make no such concession, those 
who deploy rights discourse must face this criticism. Making ‘in the alternative’ 
arguments ‘without prejudice’ does not necessarily avoid the problematic framing of 
such arguments.  
Despite these problems, I will now argue that governments have not 
‘properly’ extinguished Aboriginal rights when dealing with matters touched upon 
by the Indian Act, even though I do not concede that the government has the broader 
power to extinguish any Aboriginal rights at any time, in any context. This may 
appear to be a confusing and contradictory way to argue, particularly for readers 
without legal training. I confess that the practice is confusing and contradictory if 
taken literally. That said, Canadian legal strategies related to rights discourse cannot 
always be taken literally. Law is not a field based on so-called ‘pure reason’. As 
readers will note, I have been questioning structural determinism through this article. 
I also do this in my work more generally. While we must always be attentive to 
unequal and discriminatory power dynamics, my view is that we must not take 
absolutist positions. We must remain aware that Canadian law accommodates 
tensions and potentially conflicting positions by maintaining the fiction that 
advancing a lesser position does not always concede a larger point. As I have been 
arguing, rights are ultimately rooted in practice, not in some idealized metaphysical 
form. The contingency of rights discourse helps us to use rights as important tools 
for argumentation while not requiring us to slavishly accept rights as higher 
intellectual forms. This is what makes rights discourse both liberating and limiting. I 
acknowledge these limitations while trying to work around them to achieve a more 
liberating result. I invoke Aboriginal rights to challenge so-called government 
extinguishment—not to prove there is an authentic essence to rights, but to enhance 
Indigenous freedom through a practice that situates Indigenous philosophy in the 
lived, grounded, physical realm.  
A. Tests for Extinguishment: What Constitutes Clear and Plain Intent? 
While First Nations may be ushered onto tenuous ground in arguing that their rights 
were not ‘properly’ extinguished, there are some safeguards in place to challenge the 
government’s claim to this power. My ‘in the alternative’ argument against 
extinguishment is built on three important premises drawn from existing legal 
discourse.  
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• First, the Crown has the onus of proving that it clearly and plainly intended 
to extinguish an Aboriginal or treaty right.124  
• Second, the government will not be able to lightly imply extinguishment 
because the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that “[t]he ‘clear 
and plain’ hurdle for extinguishment is… quite high.”125  
• Third, the government needs an explicit statement of extinguishment prior 
to 1982 if such rights are to be constitutionally incapable of revival (under 
our current limited framework).  
If First Nations can demonstrate that the Crown has not met these standards in 
relation to the Indian Act, my arguments in the paragraphs to come could illustrate 
the importance of rights discourse in facilitating Indigenous freedom, despite their 
imperfections and limitations.  
Three possible tests for extinguishment are:  
1) sovereign incompatibility,  
2) actual consideration of the conflict, and  
3) an explicit statement concerning extinguishment.  
These three standards are not exhaustive, but they do track the ways in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada has commented on this issue. The third standard is the 
most appropriate test for extinguishment, which requires an explicit statement 
concerning the extinguishment of Indigenous rights. This standard is the one that 
accords with Canada’s democratic values and promotes the greatest freedom in the 
circumstances. I also believe this standard is most consistent with the surrounding 
jurisprudential framework and it aligns with interpretations of sections 91(24) and 
35(1) discussed above. Nevertheless, I will now discuss all three standards in the 
following paragraphs. 
1. Sovereign Incompatibility 
The standard of sovereign incompatibility would be a poor standard upon which to 
construct a test for the extinguishment of Aboriginal or treaty rights. It gives the 
Crown the widest possible scope in undermining Indigenous freedoms and is not a 
high hurdle for the Crown to clear. According to a thin line of authority from the 
Supreme Court, an Aboriginal or treaty right would be extinguished under the 
sovereign incompatibility test if such a right was “inconsistent with the new 
relationship” Aboriginal peoples experienced when others arrived in their lands.126 
Under this test rights could be extinguished through the mere assertion of Canadian 
                                                
124 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1099. 
125 Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 133, Lamer CJC.  
126 Mitchell v Minister of National Revenue, 2001 SCC 33 at para 150, [2001] 1 SCR 911 (CanLII) 
[Mitchell], quoting RCAP, Partners in Confederation, supra note 85 at 23. 
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law, without any need to attend to democratic aspirations underlying Canada’s 
constitutional order. As noted in Mabo v Queensland (No 2), an Australian case, “[i]t 
would be a curious doctrine to propound today that, when the benefit of the common 
law was first extended to Her Majesty’s indigenous subjects…, its first fruits were to 
strip them of their rights.”127  
Intent to extinguish must be unambiguous and certain—not implied, 
refracted and complex. Conjecture about the policy reasons behind extinguishment 
should never be a substitute for direct, unequivocal legislative expression. The 
judicial role requires the legislature and not the courts to declare whether Aboriginal 
rights were extinguished prior to 1982. Furthermore, the sovereign incompatibility 
approach should be unnecessary in an era of constitutional interpretation where 
overlapping spheres, 128  rather than watertight compartments, 129  characterize the 
scope of jurisdictional power in Canada’s Constitution. In searching for 
reconciliation very little inconsistency between Crown and Aboriginal rights and 
interests should be found.130 Consistency and harmonization between political actors 
in Canada should be the norm.131 Fortunately, though courts have entertained the 
idea, they have never ruled that extinguishment can be satisfied through sovereign 
incompatibility. As Chief Justice McLachlin wrote in Mitchell: “This Court has not 
expressly invoked the doctrine of ‘sovereign incompatibility’ in defining the rights 
protected under s. 35(1).”132 
2. Actual Consideration of the Conflict 
Another test the courts might use to assess the Crown’s intention to extinguish is 
whether there is evidence of an actual consideration of a conflict between Aboriginal 
                                                
127 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992), 175 CLR 1 at para 38, [1992] HCA 23, Brennan J (AustLII). 
128 Starr v Houlden, [1990] 1 SCR 1366, 72 OR (2d) 701 (CanLII). 
129 Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG) (The Labour Conventions Reference), [1937] AC 326 at 354, [1937] 1 
DLR 673 (JCPC). 
130 The Supreme Court of Canada has developed doctrines that permit a great deal of overlap. See Ross v 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1 SCR 5, 42 DLR (3d) 68 (CanLII); Multiple Access Ltd v 
McCutcheon, [1982] 2 SCR 161, 138 DLR (3d) 1 (CanLII). For a somewhat contrary view, see Bank of 
Montreal v Hall, [1990] 1 SCR 121, 65 DLR (4th) 361 (CanLII) [Hall], though the effect of Hall was 
reinterpreted and somewhat attenuated in Husky Oil Operations Ltd v Minister National Revenue, 
[1995] 3 SCR 453, 26 OR (3d) 81 (CanLII). However, the Supreme Court has since returned to its Hall 
analysis in Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat, 2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 SCR 113 (CanLII), and 
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 SCR 
241 (CanLII). 
131 See John Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal Governance as an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 
UBC L Rev 285 at 308–312 [Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories”]; Joel Bakan et al, Canadian 
Constitutional Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 254–255. 
132 Mitchell, supra note 126 at para 63. However, Justice Binnie, in his concurring opinion, was willing to 
find this doctrine could extinguish Aboriginal rights by the assertion of Crown sovereignty. He wrote, 
ibid at para 154: “In my opinion, sovereign incompatibility continues to be an element in the s. 35(1) 
analysis, albeit a limitation that will be sparingly applied.” Furthermore, Chief Justice McLachlin was 
also willing to find that sovereign incompatibility could limit Aboriginal rights: ibid at paras 10, 62. 
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or treaty rights and the legislation in question. In her dissent in Van der Peet, Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) wrote that 
… [t]he Canadian test for extinguishment of aboriginal rights borrows 
from the American test, enunciated in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 
(1986), at pp. 739-40: “[w]hat is essential [to satisfy the “clear and plain” 
test] is clear evidence that [the government] actually considered the 
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty 
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the 
treaty” or right.133  
A review of the Dion case reveals that Aboriginal rights can be extinguished if “upon 
reading the legislative history as a whole… Congress… believed that it was 
abrogating the rights of Indians…”134  
The Dion case’s formulation and application of the clear and plain test has 
been strongly criticized as a significant departure from long-standing standards that 
were more protective of Indian rights.135 The leading commentary on Indigenous 
legal issues in the United States, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, contains 
these cautions about Dion: “Despite its own test that Congress must have considered 
the conflict between the statute and the treaty [at issue], the Court cited no evidence 
that Congress had in fact considered reserved treaty rights.”136 The issue in the Dion 
case was whether the Bald Eagle Protection Act137 and Endangered Species Act138 
were clearly and plainly abrogated by Congress such that Dwight Dion Jr. was 
prohibited from taking eagles on his reservation. The Court found Mr. Dion’s rights 
were extinguished, even though it could not point to anything explicit on the face of 
the legislation or in the legislative record. Instead, the Court relied on “a reflection of 
an understanding” to determine that Indian rights to take eagles on their land were 
extinguished.139 In effect, the Court said that Congress did not actually consider the 
conflict. It nevertheless implied that extinguishment occurred through inference—as 
a result of a ‘reflected understanding’. This is a slender thread of reasoning. It should 
not be used to justify extinguishment. 
                                                
133 Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 286, McLachlin J dissenting. 
134 United States v Dion, 476 US 734 (1986) at 742 [Dion]. However, the Dion court also wrote that an 
“[e]xplicit statement by Congress is preferable,” but not “a per se rule”: ibid at 739. See Minnesota v 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 US 172 (1999) at 203 for an example where the application 
of the Dion test did not result in a finding of extinguishment.  
135 Robert A Williams Jr, Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal 
History of Racism in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
136  Nell Jessup Newton, ed, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2005 ed) (Newark, NJ: 
LexisNexis, 2005) at 1158, n 301. 
137 54 Stat 250, 16 USC § 668 et seq. 
138 87 Stat 884, as amended, 16 USC § 1531 et seq (1982 ed and Supp II). 
139 Dion, supra note 134 at 741 [emphasis added]. 
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Extinguishing ancient ways of life on something as seemingly ephemeral as 
a ‘reflected understanding’ does not meet the “strict” standards of proof required of 
the Crown in Canada, where “statutes relating to Indians should be liberally 
construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.”140 Canadian 
courts can do better than American courts on this front. Thus, the courts should 
reexamine the notion that the “Canadian test for extinguishment of aboriginal rights 
borrows from the American test, enunciated in United States v. Dion.”141 Courts 
should call into question the view that express language is not necessary to 
extinguish Aboriginal rights. As the Dion case illustrates, an actual consideration of 
a conflict is insufficiently clear and plain as a method of extinguishment when the 
Crown’s honour is a stake.  
3. Explicit Statement 
The explicit statement standard was articulated by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her 
dissenting opinion in R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd.: “Clear and plain means that the 
government must address the aboriginal activities in question and explicitly 
extinguish them by making them no longer permissible.”142 
While not a majority judgment, this opinion conceives of a relationship 
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown characterized by principles of honour 
and trust-like affinity. A trustee would not lightly extinguish the rights of its 
beneficiary. One of the overarching principles in section 35(1) is that Aboriginal 
peoples should be treated “with good faith,” evincing a resolve to uphold the 
Crown’s ‘honour’.143 The canons of construction requiring high standards from the 
Crown exist because of the discretion the Crown can exercise in relation to 
Aboriginal interests.144 These canons existed even before the Constitution Act, 1982 
came into effect.145 The courts have put teeth into these rules of construction because 
their strict application best facilitates “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”146 
The jurisprudential high-water mark for the test for extinguishment 
requiring an explicit statement comes from Menominee Tribe of Indians v United 
States from the United States Supreme Court in 1968.147 The issue in the Menominee 
                                                
140 Nowegijick v The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 144 DLR (3d) 193 (CanLII) [Nowegijick cited to SCR]. 
141 Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 286, McLachlin J dissenting. 
142 R v NTC Smokehouse, [1996] 2 SCR 672 at para 78, 137 DLR (4th) 528 (CanLII), L’Heureux-Dubé J 
dissenting [NTC Smokehouse]. 
143 Haida, supra note 108. 
144 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 13 DLR (4th) 321 (CanLII) [Guerin].  
145 Nowegijick, supra note 140 at 36, where the Court wrote “that treaties and statutes relating to Indians 
should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.” 
146 Delgamuukw, supra note 96 at para 186, quoting Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 31. 
147 391 US 404 (1968), 88 SCt 1705 [Menominee]. 
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case was whether the Menominee Termination Act148 of 1954, which ended the 
tribe’s special relationship with the federal government, extinguished their treaty 
hunting and fishing rights. Despite Congress’ clear intent to get rid of the 
Menominee as a political unit, Congress did not mention the tribe’s hunting and 
fishing rights in the Termination Act. Context alone was insufficient to extinguish 
their rights. More than a “reflected understanding” was needed. Justice Douglas 
wrote for the Court: “we decline to construe the Termination Act as a backhanded 
way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these Indians.”149 The Court 
concluded the intention to abrogate is not to be lightly implied. Canadian courts have 
also held that extinguishment is not to be lightly implied.150 As the Supreme Court of 
Canada wrote in the Haida case:  
The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest 
that it must be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying 
realities from which it stems. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, 
from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the 
implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably.151 
As the preceding cases affirm, courts should require “strict” proof of extinguishment 
when considering Indian rights. The standard for extinguishment is “quite high”. The 
Court should be “generous” toward the Indians, and construe extinguishment in the 
“narrowest possible manner against the Indians. This approach is most consistent 
with preserving the Crown’s honour (in the absence abandoning the doctrine 
                                                
148 1954, 68 Stat 250, codified at 25 USC §§ 891–902 [Termination Act]. 
149 Menominee, supra note 147 at 412. 
150 Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 406, 24 DLR (4th) 390, citing United States v Santa Fe 
Pacific Railroad Company, 314 US 349 (1941) at 354. Note that while the Supreme Court of Canada 
has accepted the clear and plain intent to extinguish test from the Santa Fe case, the Court has not 
applied the loose construction of extinguishment in Santa Fe to Aboriginal rights cases. See Gladstone, 
supra note 83 at para 25:  
In the case at bar, the respondent argues that the test is met when the aboriginal right and the 
activities contemplated by the legislation cannot co-exist. Such an approach, based on the view 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 
314 U.S. 339 (1941), is irreconcilable with the “clear and plain intention” test favoured in 
Canada. 
 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé (dissenting on another matter) also made this point clear in NTC Smokehouse, 
supra note 142 at para 78:  
Sparrow specifically stands for the proposition that the intention to extinguish must nonetheless 
be clear and plain. This is diametrically opposed to the position that extinguishment may be 
achieved by merely regulating an activity or that legislation necessarily inconsistent with the 
continued enjoyment of an aboriginal right can be deemed to extinguish it. Clear and plain means 
that the government must address the aboriginal activities in question and explicitly extinguish 
them by making them no longer permissible. [emphasis in original] 
151 Haida, supra note 108 at para 17.  
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altogether).152 If extinguishment is going to be a part of Canadian law, the explicit 
statement test is the one that is most consistent with a free and democratic society.  
B. Regulation of Aboriginal Rights by the Indian Act is Not Extinguishment 
The preceding section identified the most appropriate test for the extinguishment of 
Aboriginal rights, if extinguishment remains a part of Canadian law. The purpose of 
this argument was threefold: to identify the limitations of rights discourse, to show 
that rights may nevertheless be valuable to Indigenous peoples, and to apply rights 
discourse by challenging potential arguments related to extinguishment of Aboriginal 
rights under the Indian Act. In particular, I argued that governments could not 
extinguish rights without an explicit statement. In this section I will further develop 
this point and apply the explicit statement test to the Indian Act to demonstrate that 
this statute did not extinguish Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
In applying the ‘explicit statement’ extinguishment test, I now want to make 
the case that nothing in the Indian Act or its detailed regulations demonstrates a clear 
and plain intention to extinguish Aboriginal or treaty rights to band membership, 
reserve lands, succession rules, band governance, economic development, or 
education. In fact, there is significant ambiguity on each point which is fatal to a 
finding of extinguishment. The foregoing arguments support my continuing use of 
rights discourse to expand Indigenous freedom when dealing with the Indian Act. I 
will now examine specific provisions of the Act to show that they do not clearly and 
plainly extinguish Aboriginal rights in relation to the matters which they regulate. 
For example, the fact that the Indian Act includes express provisions that 
permit the Minister of Indian Affairs to “perform and exercise any of the duties, 
powers and functions that may be or are required” under the Act,153 does not reveal a 
clear intention to extinguish. These provisions could be simply seen as regulating 
Indian lands and relationships, not as defining underlying rights. The Supreme Court 
of Canada analogously wrote in regard to fishing rights in Sparrow: “That the right is 
controlled in great detail by the regulations does not mean that the right is thereby 
extinguished.”154 Thus, the federal Minister of Indian Affairs’ powers in relation to 
matters covered by the Indian Act prior to 1982 could be classified as powers of 
mere regulation, which could not extinguish those underlying rights upon which the 
Act touches.  
Subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act is also ambiguous regarding the 
government’s role in explicitly extinguishing Aboriginal or treaty rights. Section 2 
defines an Indian ‘band’ as a “body of Indians” and states that an Indian band 
                                                
152 Badger, supra note 98 at para 41: “Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an 
impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of 
the Crown.” 
153 Indian Act, supra note 18, s 3(2). 
154 Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1097. 
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council can be “chosen according to the custom of the band.”155 One in three Indian 
bands has chosen to organize their political affairs in accordance with their own 
customs.156 The fact that Indian bands continue to function under a degree of their 
own inherent authority demonstrates that, rather than extinguishing Indian 
governance, the Indian Act explicitly recognized and affirmed pre-existing 
governance powers. When bands operate by custom, they do so in accordance with 
older powers which existed prior to federal legislative intervention. Since federal 
legislation acknowledges and builds upon inherent customary powers, it would be 
improper to find a clear and plain intention to extinguish Indian rights in such 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, Indian Act regulations setting out procedures for conducting 
Band Council meetings do not contain any explicit statement extinguishing First 
Nations governance rights.157 In fact, depending on the integral governance customs 
of the Band, the Indian Act’s regulation of Band meetings could be construed by 
some First Nations as unreasonable, as denying their preferred means of exercising 
their rights, or as causing undue hardship under the Sparrow test. If a court found 
that self-government was infringed through band council regulations, the 
government would have to justify such infringements in an honourable way and in 
accordance with a valid legislative objective. In evaluating whether such 
infringement might be found it is helpful to briefly review the status of self-
government in Canadian law. 
Courts have found that Aboriginal peoples exercised governance powers in 
what is now Canada prior to Crown assertions of sovereignty.158 In Calder v British 
Columbia (AG), Justice Judson observed that “the fact is that when the settlers came, 
the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their 
forefathers had done for centuries.”159 Organization is essential to governance. The 
fact that Aboriginal peoples were “organized in societies” prior to European arrival 
implies that Aboriginal governance was an important element of their ‘pre-contact’ 
societies.160 It demonstrates that their power of self-organization pre-existed the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty and was in fact strong enough for Aboriginal 
peoples to secure land rights. These governance powers were not voluntarily 
                                                
155 Indian Act, supra note 18, s 2 (definitions of ‘band’, ‘council of the band’). 
156  Shin Imai, The 2006 Annotated Indian Act and Aboriginal Constitutional Provisions (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 15. 
157 Indian Band Council Procedures Regulations, CRC, c 950 (1978). 
158 In Sioui, supra note 84 at para 69, Chief Justice Lamer observed that Imperial powers treated Indians as 
independent nations. Arguments in this paragraph can be found in Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories”, 
supra note 131. 
159 Calder v British Columbia (AG), [1973] SCR 313 at 328, 34 DLR (3d) 145 (CanLII) [emphasis added]. 
160 The reserved rights theory of Aboriginal governance is also consistent with the proposition articulated 
in Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 30, where Chief Justice Lamer held that Aboriginal rights exist in 
section 35 because “when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here, 
living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for 
centuries” [emphasis in original].  
2016] UNEXTINGUISHED 29 
 
surrendered by the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. 161  Aboriginal peoples 
continued to exercise their powers of governance after the Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty in many ways.162 These powers are evident in matters internal to their 
societies and in their external relationships with Canada, through treaties, trade and 
conflict.163 First Nations continue to live in organized societies down to the present 
day. They are governed by ancient and contemporary customs, laws and traditions 
that give meaning and purpose to their lives,164 though there has been extensive 
regulation of these powers through instruments such as the Indian Act.165  
The Pamajewon case would place the burden of proof for Aboriginal 
governance on Aboriginal peoples.166 The Court in Pamajewon seemed to say that 
Aboriginal self-government could only exist if the practice over which governance 
was being claimed has continuity with a practice that was integral to their distinctive 
culture at the time Europeans arrived.167 This test would require that Aboriginal 
peoples introduce detailed evidence to demonstrate a continuity between the practice 
they seek to regulate in the contemporary era with a practice that was integral to their 
distinctive culture prior to the arrival of Europeans.  
While this is certainly one view of the matter, it is possible to argue that the 
Court did not completely settle the standard of proof for Aboriginal governance in 
Pamajewon. The courts may yet accept presumptions concerning the continued 
                                                
161 However, it has been held that ‘discovery’ diminished Indian rights to land: see Guerin, supra note 
144. 
162 In Sioui, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the idea that Aboriginal governance was multifaceted, 
even after the assertion of sovereignty. Writing for the Court, Justice Lamer wrote that Great Britain 
“considered [Indian nations] as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of 
governing themselves, under her protection; and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which 
she acknowledged”: Sioui, supra note 84 at 1054, citing Worcester v State of Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 
515 at 548–49 (1832) [emphasis omitted]. Justice Lamer went on to say that, as a result, “[t]he British 
Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership rights over their land, it sought to establish 
trade with them which would rise above the level of exploitation and give them a fair return. It also 
allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs, intervening in this area as little as possible”: Sioui, 
supra note 84 at 1055. 
163 Borrows, “Genealogy of Law”, supra note 36. The ability of Aboriginal peoples to exercise their 
powers of governance through the post-confederation period was demonstrated every time a First 
Nation signed a treaty. Implied within the Aboriginal treaty-making power is that Indigenous peoples 
had government authority which could bind the group. 
164 Borrows, “Stewardship”, supra note 19.  
165 For example, First Nations exercise pre-existing governance powers through the Indian custom council 
system under the Indian Act. ‘Band custom’ is defined in the Indian Act, supra note 18 at s 2(i) 
(definition of ‘council of the band’); see also Bigstone v Big Eagle, [1992] FCJ No 16, [1993] 1 CNLR 
25 (TD) (WL Can).  
166 Supra note 17. 
167 Chief Justice Lamer wrote that “claims to self-government are no different from other claims to the 
enjoyment of aboriginal rights and must, as such, be measured against the same standard”: ibid at para 
24. The ‘standard’ is that “in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right”: Van der 
Peet, supra note 11 at para 46, Lamer CJC. 
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existence of Aboriginal governance. In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer expressed 
some hesitation in applying Pamajewon to a claim for self-government: “this is not 
the right case for the Court to lay down the legal principles to guide future 
litigation.”168 He further observed: “We received little in the way of submissions that 
would help us to grapple with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance 
from the parties, it would be imprudent for the Court to step into the breach.”169 
These words suggest that the Supreme Court has not definitively settled the standard 
of proof for Aboriginal self-government and that further legal guidance is still 
needed. Whether the Chief Justice’s hesitation to apply the Pamajewon test to 
Delgamuukw flows from the complexity of the facts in the Delgamuukw case, the 
need to have a more nuanced test for governance, or both, the fact remains that the 
Court has not yet issued the last word on Aboriginal governance. As a result, another 
view of Aboriginal governance is still very much alive in the cases and commentary 
on this subject.170 
An example of the wide scope of Aboriginal governance powers was 
identified in the Campbell case coming from British Columbia.171 The Campbell case 
dealt with the allegation that the Nisga'a Treaty was inconsistent with the division of 
powers under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.172 The position taken 
by the opponents of the Treaty was that the Treaty was of no force or effect to the 
extent that it purports to provide the Nisga'a Government with legislative 
jurisdiction, or provides that the Nisga'a Government may make laws that prevail 
over federal and provincial laws. Justice Williamson ruled against the challenge, 
finding Aboriginal governance was a constitutionally protected right within the 
Nisga'a Treaty. He held that Aboriginal governance was a pre-existing right that had 
not been extinguished either by contact, by the assertion of sovereignty or by the 
                                                
168 Supra note 98 at para 170.  
169 Ibid at para 171. 
170 The other view of the source of Aboriginal governance is the one developed in this paper to this point, 
which has also been articulated by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Aboriginal 
governance is an existing right recognized and affirmed under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 167: “[T]he sphere of inherent Aboriginal jurisdiction 
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 comprises all matters relating to the good government 
and welfare of Aboriginal peoples and their territories. This sphere is divided into two sectors: a core 
and periphery.” 
171 Campbell v British Columbia (AG), 2000 BCSC 1123, 189 DLR (4th) 333 (CanLII) [Campbell]. 
172 Justice Williamson of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell, ibid at paras 179–181 wrote 
about the continued existence of Aboriginal governance. As this decision makes clear, Aboriginal rights 
to governance and jurisdiction were not extinguished prior to or at the time of Confederation, and are 
not incompatible with Aboriginal governance. When the British Parliament enacted legislation dividing 
jurisdictional powers in Canada, it did not express any clear or plain intent to extinguish Aboriginal 
jurisdiction. In the absence of clear and plain intent to extinguish, Aboriginal rights to governance and 
jurisdiction therefore survived the assertion of British sovereignty. Furthermore, First Nations powers of 
jurisdiction in British Columbia have not been extinguished since confederation. The province is 
incapable of extinguishing First Nations jurisdiction, and the federal government has not extinguished 
this jurisdiction. Aboriginal jurisdictional powers remain despite the division of powers in section 91 
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
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division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867.173 Justice Williamson described 
these protections in the following terms, in discussing the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s approach to the Constitution: 
… the object of the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 between the federal 
government and the provinces was not to extinguish diversity (or 
aboriginal rights), but to ensure that the local and distinct needs of Upper 
and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec) and the maritime provinces were 
protected in a federal system. 
… the [Supreme] Court spoke of the explicit protection for aboriginal and 
treaty rights in ss. 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, l982, as being 
consistent with a tradition of respect for minority rights reflecting “an 
important underlying constitutional value”. 
The unique relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples, then, 
is [an] underlying constitutional value. … 
A consideration of these various observations by the Supreme Court of 
Canada supports the submission that aboriginal rights, and in particular a 
right to self-government akin to a legislative power to make laws, survived 
as one of the unwritten “underlying values” of the Constitution outside of 
the powers distributed to Parliament and the legislatures in 1867. The 
federal-provincial division of powers in 1867 was aimed at a different 
issue and was a division “internal” to the Crown.174  
Justice Williamson thus found that Aboriginal governance was protected as an 
unwritten value underlying Canada’s Constitution, consistent with an unwritten 
constitutional tradition of respect for minority rights, and affirmed as an existing 
Aboriginal right under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.175 This case 
illustrates that Aboriginal governance can be protected and given broad scope in 
Canada (even if one unfortunately accepts the view that Crown sovereignty 
diminished Aboriginal power to a certain extent).176 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also reviewed the case law 
and observed that the Indian Act did not extinguish these powers. The Commission 
observed that while the federal legislation “clearly purported to alter the existing 
                                                
173 Ibid at paras 68–86.  
174 Ibid at paras 78–81. 
175 Ibid at paras 70, 81, 180.  
176 The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently upheld a different standard for the existence of 
Indigenous governance in treaties. See Sga’nisim Sim’augit (Chief Mountain) v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2013 BCCA 49, 359 DLR (4th) 231 (CanLII). There, the Court of Appeal ruled that Canada 
and the provinces can delegate elements of their constitutional powers to a First Nation through treaty as 
long as the governments oversee how these powers are used. At the same time, the Court of Appeal was 
quick to hold that “[i]t is unnecessary to decide whether some or all of the self-government powers 
derive from an inherent Aboriginal right”: ibid at para 8. Thus, the Sga’nisim case does not address the 
central question of whether treaties incorporate inherent rights to self-government. For critical 
commentary, see Joshua Nichols, “Claims of Sovereignty–Burdens of Occupation: William and the 
Future of Reconciliation” (2015) 48:1 UBC L Rev 221 (QL).  
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governmental structures of Indian peoples… such measures did not build upon 
completely new foundations.”177 The Commission found that federal measures “took 
for granted the existence of Indian nations as distinct political entities” and left intact 
a degree of their inherent decision-making power. Thus, the Commission concluded 
that “it does not appear that federal Indian legislation purported to deprive Indian 
peoples of all governmental authority, even if it severely disrupted and distorted their 
political structures and left them with very limited powers.”178  
Thus, there are credible arguments in law and fact that Aboriginal 
governance is an existing Aboriginal right under section 35(1) of the Constitution. 
As I have also tried to briefly sketch, there are also significant arguments that the 
Indian Act has not extinguished Aboriginal governance powers.179 If these arguments 
were accepted, future federal actions related to the Indian Act could be constrained 
because section 35(1) modifies federal power when unextinguished Aboriginal or 
treaty rights are at stake. The federal government should not have free rein when 
dealing with issues covered by the Indian Act; its powers should be constrained to 
facilitate Indigenous freedom and to further democracy. If rights discourse were 
employed to assist in these developments it could be argued that the federal 
government has, inter alia, duties of recognition, consultation, accommodation and 
reconciliation to fulfill if it were to introduce new legislation that affected 
unextinguished Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
If such were the case, the government would have to justify the infringing 
provisions in the Indian Act by demonstrating that their passage accorded with a 
valid legislative objective and that their enactment preserved the Crown’s honour 
towards the Indians. While the Crown would likely establish that the regulations 
embraced a valid legislative objective, they may have difficulty proving these 
regulations accord with the Crown’s obligations of reconciliation, consultation and 
accommodation. In particular, the regulations may be found to be biased towards 
non-Aboriginal forms of governance and thus lead a Court to conclude that the 
Crown failed to prevent the perpetuation of the historic injustice suffered by 
Aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers, as required by Côté.180 It would be 
                                                
177 RCAP, Partners in Confederation, supra note 85 at 35. 
178 Ibid. 
179 See Frank Cassidy & Robert L Bish, Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice (Lantzville, BC: 
Oolichan Books, 1989). Most communities have received the Indian Act structure in a complex way, 
without surrendering their underlying laws and philosophies, though they have been heavily influenced 
by its regulations. See John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada (Ottawa: Law 
Commission of Canada, 2006). Perhaps the greatest challenge to the extinguishment of First Nations 
government through the Indian Act is represented by the case Logan v Styres, [1959] OWN 361, 20 
DLR (2d) 416 (HC) (WL Can) (upholding land surrender under Indian Act by those opposed to band 
council). This is ironic because the Haudenosaunee to whom the case applies are perhaps the most 
clearly opposed to the Canadian government’s assumption of control: Relatively few people vote in 
band elections, many are allied with traditional government philosophies, and most resist the idea that 
extinguishment can occur. While the case can be limited in its application to land allocation issues, if 
expansively applied it could represent a finding of Parliamentary extinguishment of traditional 
governance powers. In making this determination courts should remember the canons of construction, 
the honour of the Crown, and the the Indian Act’s rejection amongst the Haudenosaunee.  
180 Côté, supra note 91 at para 53. 
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unjust to compel First Nations to abandon their cultural governance practices for 
Parliamentary forms of political organization. Other Indian Act sections or 
regulations could also violate section 35 principles.  
When it comes to questions of extinguishment, other Indian Act provisions 
may be considered even more ambiguous than the three paths to extinguishment 
described previously This would help facilitate governance as we remember that 
ambiguity in statutory provisions dealing with Indians should be resolved in their 
favour.181 An example of ambiguity regarding extinguishment relates to whether the 
Indian Act has extinguished Aboriginal or treaty rights to make decisions concerning 
land allocation within these communities. Section 20 of the Indian Act outlines 
procedures for possession of reserve lands by individual Indians. These provisions 
state that “[n]o Indian is lawfully in possession of land in a reserve unless, with the 
approval of the Minister, possession of the land has been allotted to him by the 
council of the band.”182 This language may lead one to conclude that pre-existing 
customs related to individual land use are extinguished. However, a couple of points 
may cast doubt on this assumption and make extinguishment appear less clear and 
plain.183  
First, most Indian bands have acted as if the Indian Act permitted a choice 
about how lands were to be used: collectively or individually. 184 Some bands 
choosing to use land in an individual fashion often adopted certificates of possession. 
In these cases, bands often allotted lands to individuals who were historically in 
possession of what later became land parcels under the Indian Act. In these 
circumstances it could be argued that allotment did not extinguish pre-existing 
allocation rights but merely allowed bands to confirm their traditional land uses.  
Second, other bands have acted in accordance with the idea that a ‘band’ is 
“a body of Indians,”185 “for whose use and benefit in common, lands, the legal title to 
which is vested in Her Majesty, have been set apart.”186 For those bands that have 
adopted this interpretation, “common” use and benefit is interpreted as allowing their 
collective land use allocation. The fact that the Indian Act allows for the collective 
ownership and development of band lands implies custom has a role in allocating 
land use.  
                                                
181 See Nowegijick, supra note 140 at 36: “statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and 
doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.” 
182 Indian Act, supra note 18, s 20(1). 
183 One should also note the First Nations Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24, which allows First 
Nations to control their land allocation by opting out of the Indian Act, without Aboriginal or derogating 
any Aboriginal or treaty rights they may possess. 
184 See generally Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantra & André Le Dressay, Beyond the Indian Act: 
Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) 
at 73–119. 
185 Indian Act, supra note 18, s 2(1)(a) (definition of ‘band’). 
186 Ibid.  
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Third, it is estimated that over half the individually allotted lands on 
reserves are not held by certificate procedures but in accordance with band 
customs.187 Are such people trespassers on their own lands, even though held in 
accordance with their own customs, if their allotment is not held by a certificate of 
possession? This cannot be the case. While some judicial decisions hold that custom 
or band action without more can not grant a legal interest to an individual 
enforceable under the Indian Act,188 this interpretation has not been universally 
followed by the courts.189 Therefore, the better interpretation is that section 20 of the 
Indian Act has not clearly and plainly extinguished Aboriginal or treaty rights to land 
allocation within reserves.  
Both the above governance and land allocation examples demonstrate that 
the Indian Act heavily regulated, but did not extinguish, underlying Aboriginal and 
treaty rights. The Act’s formal provisions point to the inherency and resiliency of 
First Nations rights.190 The legislation’s actual operation shows that First Nations 
continue to access their own pre-existing sources of authority to give governance 
meaning within their communities.191 Recognizing these interpretations of Canadian 
legal doctrines related to First Nations’ rights affected by the Indian Act undermines 
the legislation’s constitutionality and potentially frees them from its restrictive 
grasp.192 Thus, even without future amendment or changes to issues covered by the 
Indian Act, the current legislation under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
could be seen as a violation of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 because its 
provisions unjustifiably infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights. This demonstrates the 
potential usefulness of rights discourse in facilitating Indigenous freedom in a 
democratic context.  
 
 
                                                
187  Douglas Sanders, “The Present System of Land Ownership” (First Nations Land Ownership 
Conference delivered at the Justice Institute of British Columbia, Vancouver, 29–30 September 1988) 
[unpublished]. 
188 See, e.g., Lower Nicola Indian Band v Trans-Canada Displays Ltd, 2000 BCSC 1209, [2000] BCJ No 
1672 (CanLII); Joe v Findlay, [1987] 2 CNLR 75, 12 BCLR (2d) 166 (SC) (CanLII). 
189 See, e.g., George v George, [1997] 2 CNLR 62, 139 DLR (4th) 53 (BCCA) (CanLII); Stoney Band v 
Poucette, [1999] 3 CNLR 321, 1996 CarswellAlta 1091 (QB) (CanLII), aff’d 1998 ABCA 244 
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190 Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream is That Our 
Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000); 
Borrows, “Genealogy of Law”, supra note 36 at 341–351. 
191 Frank Cassidy, ed, Aboriginal Self-Determination (Lantzville, BC & Montreal: Oolichan Books & 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991) at 33–62. Analysis of the constitutionality of the Indian 
Act should pay attention “to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake”: 
Sparrow, supra note 30 at 1112.  
192 For a discussion of many of these points in a US context, see David E Wilkins & K Tsianina 
Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2001). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Freedom is a multifaceted, contingent, context-dependent activity that is best 
pursued as a relational activity. Right discourse fits this pattern if we pursue it as a 
democratic practice which allows people to recognize and challenge false horizons in 
their lives. At the same time rights must be used with caution because they can 
constrain us if they are seen as flowing from universal, essentialized, a priori ideas. 
When rights are poorly developed and then rigidly construed they can severely 
diminish the scope of freedom because they can appear universally fixed and 
therefore impossible to change. 
On the other hand, if rights were strategically deployed they could challenge 
the Indian Act and other federal actions that purportedly extinguish Aboriginal or 
treaty rights. First Nations have strong arguments that they possess existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights under section 35(1) that are adversely affected by the 
Indian Act. For example, they could argue they have unextinguished rights related to 
Indian status, reserve land-holding, succession rules, political organization, 
economic development and education. This article has argued that First Nations 
could contend that the Indian Act invalidly touches on these matters contrary to 
rights protected under section 35(1).  
This article has also tried to make a more general point about the doctrine of 
extinguishment in Canadian law. Extinguishment without consent is a highly 
offensive violation of Indigenous peoples’ human rights and is contrary to rights 
discourse more generally. Alternatively, First Nations could argue that the Crown 
would not be able to prove extinguishment in relation to rights touched by the Indian 
Act because there is no evidence of clear and plain intent to extinguish those rights 
through the Act’s operation. For example, it could be shown that sovereign 
incompatibility or a mere consideration of conflicts between Aboriginal rights and 
the Indian Act should not satisfy the high standard required to prove extinguishment. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that extensive regulation under the Indian Act of 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights also did not amount to extinguishment. In fact, 
as this article has shown, an examination of the Indian Act reveals many sections that 
recognized and built upon the pre-existing practices, customs and traditions of First 
Nations societies. As a result, rather than extinguishing Aboriginal and treaty rights, 
it could be held that the Indian Act’s passage and operation may be solid evidence of 
their continued existence, though they were negatively impacted by the Act’s 
operation. If properly deployed, rights discourse could be an important tool in 
developing “the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the 
ethos, the practice of the self, which would allow these games of power to be played 
with a minimum of domination.”193  
                                                
193 Michel Foucault, “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in James Bernauer & David 
Rasmussen, eds, The Final Foucault (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) 1 at 18, cited in Tully, 
Democracy and Civic Freedom, supra note 47 at 121. 
